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BEST INTERESTS AND STATUTORY
CONSTRUCTION OF THE INDIAN CHILD
WELFARE ACT*
I. INTRODUCTION
Statutory construction is an inexact science. Ideally, the legisla-
ture will have made its intentions clear in the language of the statute;
where it has not, courts and practitioners must look to the underlying
purpose of the statute, the legislative history and the case law to deter-
mine how to apply a statute in each case. In Catholic Social Services,
Inc. v. C.A.A., 1 the Alaska Supreme Court was presented with a ques-
tion on which the governing statute, the Indian Child Welfare Act of
1978 ("ICWA" or "Act"),2 is silent: are Indian tribes entitled to noti-
fication of voluntary proceedings to terminate parental rights to an
Indian child? The court took a narrow view, refusing to extrapolate a
right to notice where express statutory authority for such a right was
lacking.3 Despite a clear mandate that tribes be notified of involuntary
terminations,4 under Catholic Social Services Indian tribes in Alaska
are not entitled to notice of voluntary relinquishment proceedings.5
Though the lack of a specific notice provision for voluntary relin-
quishments might seem dispositive of the notice question, the Catholic
Social Services decision violates the overall language and fundamental
purpose of the ICWA. As its title implies, the Act is designed to pro-
tect the welfare of Indian children by promoting the stability and in-
tegrity of Indian families and tribes. 6 The decision in this case works
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1. 783 P.2d 1159 (Alaska 1989) (per curiam).
2. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901-63 (1988).
3. 783 P.2d at 1160.
4. As will be explained more fully, infra notes 45-48 and accompanying text, the
Act clearly mandates that tribes receive notice of involuntary termination proceed-
ings, see 25 U.S.C. § 1912(a) (1988), but says nothing about whether there must be
notice of voluntary proceedings. The majority finds this distinction dispositive of
Congress' view of the tribe's rights in this situation. See also infra note 81 for text of
§ 1912(a).
5. 783 P.2d at 1160.
6. 25 U.S.C. § 1902 (1988).
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to the detriment of children and tribes, allowing parents and adoption
agencies to avoid tribal participation in the proceedings and poten-
tially subjecting the child to needless protracted litigation. By adher-
ing to a superficial reading of the Act's language, the Catholic Social
Services court emasculates the tribes' right to intervene in child cus-
tody proceedings. 7 More importantly, however, the court failed to ap-
ply the Act in a manner consistent with the best interests of Indian
children being voluntarily relinquished.8
This case demonstrates with striking clarity a major difficulty
with cases affecting the welfare of children in any context: the conflict
between the actual parties - here the social service agency and the
adoptive parents against the natural mother and the tribe - com-
pletely subsumes the real issue, which is who the child's family should
be. The ICWA, like other statutes affecting children and families, has
at its heart the best interests of the child. The ICWA is also concerned
with advancing the best interests of Indian tribes. The Alaska
Supreme Court's construction of the Act in Catholic Social Services
shows an insufficient concern for the best interests of this child or her
tribe. Had the Act's language or legislative history clearly provided
that tribes were not to be notified of voluntary termination proceed-
ings, there would be little doubt that the Catholic Social Services court
had reached the correct result. Since reasons for the opposite conclu-
sion are more compelling, the Alaska Supreme Court should have held
that Alaska Indian tribes have the right to notice of voluntary pro-
ceedings to terminate the parental rights to an Indian child. 9
7. See infra notes 64-71 and accompanying text. Whether the tribes have an
unqualified right to intervene is a point of some contention. The majority in Catholic
Social Services held summarily that such a right does not exist. 783 P.2d at 1160.
This holding directly contradicts 25 U.S.C. § 191 l(c) (1988), which states that "in any
state court proceeding for the... termination of parental rights to an Indian child, the
... Indian child's tribe shall have a right to intervene at any point in the proceeding."
Id. The majority similarly dispenses with any due process concerns raised by the
combination of a right to intervene and no right to notice. 783 P.2d at 1160. Further-
more, the court's reading contradicts a previous case in which the court held that
section 1911(c) applied to terminations of parental rights. In re J.R.S., 690 P.2d 10,
15 (Alaska 1984).
8. See inJfa notes 82-100 and accompanying text.
9. As will be discussed more fully, infra notes 49-52 and accompanying text, this
is essentially the position taken by Justice Rabinowitz in his dissent, 783 P.2d at 1161-
63.
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A. Background
The ICWA is a federal statute that applies to all state child cus-
tody proceedings 10 involving an Indian child."l The Act was designed
to curb the wholesale removal of Indian children from their homes by
social workers ignorant of Indian childrearing practices12 by "estab-
lish[ing] minimum Federal standards for the removal of Indian chil-
dren from their families .. .which will reflect the unique values of
Indian culture .... -13 These standards and procedures, as set forth in
sections 1911-22, are grafted onto the state's child custody mecha-
nisms and apply whenever an Indian child is the subject of a child
custody proceeding. Under Alaska law, parents can voluntarily relin-
quish their parental rights either by giving their consent for someone
else to adopt the child, 14 or by relinquishing the child to the custody of
a placement agency. 15 When either procedure involves an Indian
child, the court is required to determine which, if any, portions of the
10. See 25 U.S.C. § 1903(1)(i-iv) (1988) (defining the various types of child cus-
tody proceedings; voluntary terminations are included in section 1903(1)(ii)).
11. See id. § 1903(4) (defining Indian child).
12. See Comment, The Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978. Protecting Essential
Tribal Interests, 60 U. COLO. L. REv. 131, 131-32 (1989); Barsh, The Indian Child
Welfare Act of 1978: A Critical Analysis, 31 HASTINGS L.J. 1287, 1288-1305 (1980);
Hearings Before the U.S. Senate Select Committee on Indian Affairs on S. 1214, 95th
Cong., 1st Sess. 537 (1977) [hereinafter Select Committee Hearings] (Indian child wel-
fare statistical survey showing the numbers of Indian children removed from their
homes as compared to white children across a number of states).
13. 25 U.S.C. § 1902 (1988) (congressional declaration of policy underlying the
Act).
14. ALASKA STAT. § 25.23.060 (Supp. 1989). Consent to adopt can be revoked
under the terms of section 25.23.070 of the Alaska Statutes which allows revocation
within 10 days of consent or, after 10 days and up until the formal adoption decree, by
a showing that revocation is in the child's best interests. ALASKA STAT. § 25.23.070
(Supp. 1989).
15. ALASKA STAT. § 25.23.180 (Supp. 1989). In this case parents have only 10
days to withdraw consent. Id. (1)(b). See generally Note, Abandonment v. Adoption:
Terminating Parental Rights and the Need for Distinct Legal Inquiries, 7 ALASKA L.
REv. 247 (1990) (discussing standards and procedures for termination of parental
rights under Alaska law).
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Act are relevant and how they alter the state's procedures. 16 Further-
more, the Act grants the Indian child's tribe certain rights if the pro-
ceeding remains in the state court.' 7 Where the parent voluntarily
relinquishes parental rights to an Indian child, the Act's consent and
certification procedures govern rather than those of state law.' 8
Catholic Social Services, Inc. v. C.A.A. begins with a mother,
C.A.A., 19 and her daughter, C.M.F.,20 who was born in 1980. Both
C.A.A. and C.M.F.'s father are Indians enrolled in recognized tribes;
there is no dispute that C.M.F. is an Indian child 2' and that any pro-
ceedings relating to her custody are governed by the ICWA. 22
Throughout the first six years of C.M.F.'s life, C.A.A. had chronic
difficulties with alcohol which made it difficult for her to care for
C.M.F. and caused her to physically, verbally and emotionally abuse
C.M.F.23
In March 1986, C.A.A. contacted Catholic Social Services, Inc.
("CSS"),24 stating that she wished to relinquish her parental rights to
C.M.F. and to allow her daughter to be adopted.25 Though C.A.A.
changed her mind at one point and had C.M.F. returned to her,26 she
16. For instance, if a child is domiciled on a reservation, the tribal court of the
child's tribe generally has exclusive jurisdiction over the proceeding. 25 U.S.C.
§ 1911(a) (1988). Other sections of the Act alter the evidentiary standards for termi-
nating parental rights, id. § 1912(f); establish separate consent and withdrawal peri-
ods, id. § 1913(a)-(c); allow collateral attack of termination orders, id. § 1914; and
establish placement preferences once adoption or placement becomes appropriate, id.
§ 1915.
17. E.g., 25 U.S.C. § 1911(c) (1988) (granting the tribe the right to intervene in
any child custody proceeding); id. § 1912(c) (mandating that the tribe be notified of
any involuntary termination of parental rights).
18. See id. § 1913.
19. Hearings in Alaska proceedings dealing with adoptions and relinquishments
of parental rights are confidential. ALASKA STAT. § 25.23.150 (Supp. 1989). The
names of the parties are abbreviated to protect the identities of the child and the bio-
logical and adoptive parents. Id. § 25.23.150(c).
20. C.A.A.'s other two children, M. and J., are not involved in these proceedings.
21. See 25 U.S.C. § 1903(4) (1988).
22. See id. § 1903(1)(ii).
23. See Opening Brief for Appellants at 3, Catholic Social Serv., Inc. v. C.A.A.,
783 P.2d 1159 (Alaska 1989) (No. S-2879) [hereinafter Opening Brief for Appellants];
Brief for Appellees at 2, Catholic Social Serv., Inc. v. C.A.A., 739 P.2d 1159 (Alaska
1989) (No. S-2879) [hereinafter Brief for Appellees]; Brief for the Guardian ad litem
at 2, Catholic Social Serv., Inc. v. C.A.A., 783 P.2d 1159 (Alaska 1989) (No. S-2879)
[hereinafter Brief for Guardian ad litem].
24. By its own description, CSS is a non-profit social service agency which pro-
vides a range of services to Catholics and non-Catholics alike. It has served as a
private adoption agency in Alaska for a number of years. Opening Brief for Appel-
lants at 10 n.6.
25. Brief for Guardian ad litem at 3.
26. Id.; Brief for Appellees at 3.
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appeared before a probate master on June 30, 1986, and signed a for-
mal Relinquishment of Parental Rights.27 The master explained the
nature of the proceeding, questioned C.A.A. to ensure that the pro-
ceeding was voluntary and told her that she had a ten-day period in
which to rescind the relinquishment before it would become final, all
of which C.A.A. understood.28 C.A.A. also indicated whom she
wished to have adopt C.M.F.29 On July 14, 1986, the superior court
entered a decree terminating C.A.A.'s parental rights.30 C.A.A. then
surrendered C.M.F. to CSS, who gave physical custody of the child to
the adoptive family.
B. The Proceedings Below
On March 26, 1987, the adoptive family formally petitioned to
adopt C.M.F. 31 In the intervening eight months, however, C.A.A.
had stopped drinking and had contacted her tribe, the Cook Inlet Tri-
bal Council ("CITC" or "Tribe") 32 for help in regaining custody of
C.M.F. That same day, C.A.A. filed a Revocation of Relinquish-
ment.33 CITC moved successfully to intervene,34 and together with
27. See Brief for Appellees at 4 n.5.
28. Opening Brief for Appellants at 4. As described supra notes 14 and 15, relin-
quishment is not the only method of voluntary termination. C.A.A. argues that CSS
failed to explain the consent to adoption option to her, thereby invalidating her con-
sent to relinquish C.M.F. Brief for Appellees at 4-5. This issue was not before the
Alaska Supreme Court, however, as C.A.A. concedes. Id. at 5 n.7. While she may
not have understood the scope of available options, there is nothing indicating that
C.A.A. did not understand what would happen as a result of the proceeding in which
she participated. This is confirmed by the probate master's certification to that effect
immediately preceding the Final Termination of Parental Rights. Master's Report,
No. 3AN-86-394P/A (3d Dist. Super. Ct. Nov. 12, 1987); see Opening Brief for Ap-
pellants at 5.
29. C.A.A. stated that she wished Mr. and Mrs. G., a Caucasian couple, to adopt
C.M.F. The G.s are appellants in this case along with CSS. Whether or not C.M.F.
should be placed permanently with the G.s is a separate inquiry to be decided at the
adoption proceeding. C.A.A.'s preferences are to be considered where appropriate, 25
U.S.C. § 1915(c) (1988); but placement is ultimately determined according to the
child's best interests within the Act's placement preferences, id. §§ 1915(a) and (b).
At the time of the appeal to the Alaska Supreme Court, C.M.F. still resided with the
G.s.
30. In re C.M.F., No. 3AN-86-394P/A (3d Dist. Super. Ct. June 24, 1988).
31. This complies with the six-month period between termination and adoption
required by CSS. Opening Brief for Appellants at 5.
32. CITC is also an appellee, along with C.A.A.
33. Brief for Appellees at 6. It is not entirely clear what happened procedurally at
this point. The termination proceeding had already been completed, but C.A.A.'s
motion seems to have reopened it and stayed the adoption proceeding. Though no
stay has formally been issued, no action has been taken on that matter since the con-
flict surrounding the termination resurfaced. Brief for the Guardian ad litem at 5 n.5.
According to the appellees, the Tribe's participation caused the master to decide not
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C.A.A. petitioned the superior court to set aside the termination de-
cree. 35 The Tribe's memorandum in support of its motion listed ten
reasons36 why the decree should be set aside. C.A.A. filed a separate
memorandum focusing both on the Tribe's right to notice of the pro-
ceedings and on whether or not she had been afforded due process. 37
The master then issued a report 38 recommending that C.A.A.'s motion
be denied, stating explicitly that the Tribe had no right to receive no-
tice of a voluntary proceeding, either on statutory or constitutional
grounds.39
to recommend that the superior court formally decree adoption. Brief for Appellees at
7.
34. Brief for Appellees at 7. The Tribe made its motion on May 7 and was condi-
tionally allowed to intervene on June 29, upon submission within 30 days of objections
to the termination decree.
35. The parties actually made two separate motions. C.A.A. moved to set aside
the termination decree on July 16, while the Tribe moved to invalidate the termination
under 25 U.S.C. § 1914 (1988) on August 24. Brief for Appellees at 7. See infra note
72 and accompanying text for discussion of section 1914.
36. These reasons were:
1. The tribe was never given timely notice of the termination proceedings;
2. The tribe was deprived of its right to intervene and of its right to request
transfer [to a tribal court];
3. C.A.A. was deprived of her right to court-appointed counsel;
4. No evidence was ever presented that active efforts had been made to
provide remedial services and rehabilitation programs to prevent the break-
up of C.A.A.'s family;
5. The relinquishment was neither fully informed nor voluntary;
6. The "relinquishment" was in fact a consent to adoption which was re-
voked in a timely manner pursuant to 25 U.S.C. § 1913(c);
7. Even if the relinquishment was voluntary, it was invalid under ALASKA
STAT. § 25.23.180(b) because no actual physical relinquishment occurred;
8. The final decree was void under ALASKA STAT. § 25.23.180 (b) because
it was entered less than ten days after the relinquishment;
9. The termination proceedings were involuntary and thus commenced in
violation of ALASKA STAT. § 47.10.010 et seq., the provisions of 25 U.S.C.
§ 1912 and the mandatory standards of proof set forth in 25 U.S.C.
§ 1912(f) and ALASKA STAT. § 47.10.080(c)(3);
10. The termination decree, whether or not based on a voluntary relin-
quishment, was reviewable for good cause under ALASKA STAT.
§ 47.10.080(f).
Opening Brief for Appellants at 6-7 (emphasis added). These assertions were shared
by C.A.A. Brief for the Guardian ad litem at 6.
37. Opening Brief for Appellants at 7.
38. Master's Report, No. 3AN-86-394P/A (3d Dist. Super. Ct. Nov. 12, 1987).
The report was issued on November 12, 1987, and was followed by an addendum on
November 18.
39. Id. See Opening Brief for Appellants at 8; Brief for Appellees at 7; Brief for
Guardian ad litem at 7.
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The superior court heard the case and reversed, issuing an order
to set aside the termination decree.4° Although the court agreed that
the Act did not specifically provide for tribal notice of voluntary pro-
ceedings, Judge Carlson found that the Tribe had the right to inter-
vene under 25 U.S.C. § 1911(c), 4 1 and that:
[t]he tribe's right to intervene as provided by the statute would be
hollow and without practical effect if there was not a duty imposed
upon the court to ensure that the tribe, in fact, had been notified
and given the opportunity to respond as is required in an involun-
tary termination proceeding.42
Judge Carlson also held that the right of Indian parents to place their
children without notifying the Tribe did not outweigh the Tribe's right
to notice. 43
C. The Supreme Court Appeal
CSS and the adoptive family appealed Judge Carlson's decision to
the Alaska Supreme Court on the sole issue of whether tribes have the
right to be notified of voluntary termination proceedings. After
lengthy consideration, the court, per curiam, reversed the superior
court and remanded the case for further proceedings, ostensibly to
move forward with the adoption.44 The majority concluded summa-
rily that Congress explicitly granted tribes the right to intervene in
involuntary terminations but not in voluntary ones.45 The court held
40. In re C.M.F., No. 3AN-86-394P/A (3d Dist. Super. Ct. June 24, 1988). See
Opening Brief for Appellants at 9; Brief for Appellees at 7-8; Brief for Guardian ad
litem at 8.
41. 25 U.S.C. § 1911(c) (1988) states, in relevant part:
(c) State court proceedings; intervention.
In any State court proceeding for the foster care placement of, or termi-
nation of parental rights to, an Indian child, the Indian custodian of the
child and the Indian child's tribe shall have a right to intervene at any point
in the proceeding.
42. In re C.M.F., No. 3AN-86-394P/A (3d Dist. Super. Ct. June 24, 1988). See
Brief for Guardian ad litem at 8-9.
43. In re C.M.F., No. 3AN-86-394P/A (3d Dist. Super. Ct. June 24, 1988); brief
for Guardian ad litem at 9.
44. Catholic Social Servs., Inc. v. C.A.A., 783 P.2d 1159, 1160 (Alaska 1989).
45. Id. As will be discussed infra in text accompanying note 65, the basis for the
Alaska Supreme Court's conclusion that this right does not exist is unclear, particu-
larly in light of In re J.R.S., 690 P.2d 10 (Alaska 1984). In J.R.S., the court allowed a
tribe to intervene in an adoption proceeding absent a specific authorization in the Act.
"If Indian tribes are to protect the values Congress recognized when it enacted the
Indian Child Welfare Act, tribes must be allowed to participate in hearings at which
those values are significantly impaired." Id. at 15. This right was granted even
though the court held that section 1911(c) did not apply to adoption proceedings at
all, but does apply to terminations of parental rights. Id. The court's application of
section 1911 (c) to some child custody proceedings but not to others is puzzling in its
own right, given the language of the section. See supra note 41. Nevertheless, the
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that Congress did not extend the tribe's rights, as created by the
ICWA, to include participation in voluntary proceedings, and that
Congress' failure to do so is not fundamentally unfair. 46 The court
found the Act's silence on this issue dispositive: "Congress explicitly
granted intervention rights to tribes in involuntary termination pro-
ceedings, but did not do so in voluntary termination proceedings....
The legislative history of the Act demonstrates that this was a consid-
ered choice by Congress." 47 Based on this lack of evidence, as bol-
stered by similar language in the Bureau of Indian Affairs' Guidelines
for State Courts,48 the majority held that tribes are not entitled to any
notice of voluntary termination proceedings.
Justice Rabinowitz wrote a vigorous, albeit solitary, dissent,
based on his view that 25 U.S.C. § 1911(c) gives tribes an absolute
right to intervene in all child custody proceedings, 49 regardless of the
parents' consent. He argued that the majority decision, by failing to
recognize this right, permits parents to circumvent the Tribe's "equal
interest in the Indian child."'50 From this right to intervene, it follows
Catholic Social Services court's reading of § 1911(c), and the intervention right in gen-
eral, runs directly counter to J.R.S., and the court neither cites nor reconciles it.
46. Catholic Social Servs., 783 P.2d at 1160.
47. Id.
48. Department of the Interior, Bureau of Indian Affairs, Guidelines for State
Courts, 44 Fed. Reg. 67584, 67586 (1979). These guidelines, which represent the De-
partment's interpretations of the Act and have no binding legislative authority, Bat-
terton v. Francis, 432 U.S. 416, 424 (1977), state that "[t]he Act mandates a tribal
right of notice and intervention in involuntary proceedings but not voluntary ones.
Cf 25 U.S.C. § 1912 with 25 U.S.C. § 1913." 44 Fed. Reg. at 67586.
49. Catholic Social Servs.,783 P.2d at 1162 (Rabinowitz, J., dissenting). Seesupra
note 41 for the text of section 1911(c).
50. Id. (citing Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, - U.S. -, 109
S. Ct. 1597 (1989)).
At the time of publication of this note, the Tribe planned to file a petition for
certiorari to the United States Supreme Court. Catholic Social Servs., Inc. v. C.A.A.,
783 P.2d 1159 (Alaska 1989) (per curiam), petition for cert. filed (Mar. 29, 1989). The
petition argues that the Catholic Social Services decision is in conflict with the Missis-
sippi Choctaw decision. In Mississippi Choctaw, an Indian woman, ready to give birth
to twins, purposely went to a hospital 200 miles from her home on the reservation.
The woman was attempting to avoid having her domicile on the reservation attach to
the children, and thus prevent the tribal court from asserting jurisdiction over the
placement under section 1911(a). - U.S. at -, 109 S. Ct. at 1602-03. The Mississippi
Choctaw majority held explicitly that the ICWA "was not meant to be defeated by the
actions of individual members of the tribe," id. at -, 109 S. Ct. at 1608, and that the
Act's provisions must be seen "as a means of protecting not only the interests of indi-
vidual Indian children and families, but also of the tribes themselves," id. at -, 109 S.
Ct. at 1609.
By withholding notice to the tribes, parents and adoptive families may be able to
prevent the tribe from intervening, inter alia, under section 191 1(c), or from asserting
the placement preferences under section 1915, a situation that the Tribe argues is
directly analogous to the actions of the parents in Mississippi Choctaw.
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that "a tribal right to notice is necessarily implicit in the tribe's funda-
mental and unqualified intervention right under section 1911(c)," 51
and that "the powers given tribes by virtue of sections 1911 and 1915
prove illusory unless the tribe is given notice of a voluntary termina-
tion proceeding." '52
D. A Closer Look at the Case and the Interests at Stake
This case presented the Alaska Supreme Court with a difficult
task. The lack of legislative guidance combined with the unique inter-
ests of the Tribe, the child and the parents left the court with an awk-
ward balancing act to perform.
The ICWA is silent as to whether tribes have a right to be notified
of voluntary termination proceedings. Notice is explicitly required
when parental rights to an Indian child are involuntarily terminated,
and the Act details the procedure for providing notice in those situa-
tions.53 By omitting any mention of tribal notice of voluntary relin-
quishments from the language of the statute, Congress created
confusion regarding how far the express right to notification of invol-
untary proceedings extends. Consequently, the court was forced to
balance the privacy interests of the relinquishing parent against the
concurrent interest in tribal survival and integrity.
The legislative history of the Act, another source of authority for
resolving this confusion, is similarly unclear on what notice the tribes
are entitled to receive. As the Catholic Social Services court noted,
Congress heard testimony on both sides of the notice issue.54 This
testimony dealt primarily with involuntary removals rather than vol-
untary relinquishments, though periodic references to relinquishment-
type fact patterns suggest that the removals and relinquishments were
51. Catholic Social Sers., 783 P.2d at 1662-63.
52. Id. at 1663.
53. 25 U.S.C. § 1912(a) (1988) (see infra note 78 for the text of § 1912(a)).
54. 783 P.2d at 1160. See Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978: Hearings on S. 1214
Before the Subcomm. on Indian Affairs and Public Lands of the House Comm. on
Interior and Insular Affairs, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 62, 191-92 [hereinafter House Hear-
ings] (testimony of Chief Calvin Isaac supporting notice to tribes when Indian chil-
dren are removed from homes); id. at 87-90 (testimony of Sister Mary Clare claiming
that notice to tribes deprived parents of choices of adoptive homes).
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considered to be the same.55 The Alaska Supreme Court read this am-
biguity to mean that Congress intended that tribes not be notified.56
In light of the basic purpose of the Act,57 however, it is more plausible
to interpret the Act as containing a right of notice in all termination
proceedings. On balance, the legislative history provides no direct gui-
dance on the issue of tribal notice concerning voluntary termination
proceedings, leaving the court to interpret the equivocal testimony on
its own.
Whether tribes have a right to notice of voluntary termination
proceedings is an issue of first impression nationwide. There are nu-
merous cases upholding a tribe's right to be notified of involuntary
terminations,5 8 but none that have addressed the distinction, if any,
between voluntary and involuntary terminations. Therefore, there was
no other judicial analysis of the relevant issues available to guide the
Alaska Supreme Court as it broke new doctrinal ground.
This issue, like others relating to children, affects the lives of peo-
ple beyond the actual parties to the litigation. Though this conflict
exists ostensibly between two sets of parents, an agency and an Indian
tribe, it is in reality a case about where a child should live and who his
or her parents should be. Consequently, and particularly since the
55. House Hearings, supra note 54. The testimony of Sister Mary Clare discusses
relinquishments exclusively, not removals. Similarly, H.R. REP. No. 1386, 95th
Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 7530,
7533, discusses the due process concerns both in terms of removals and
relinquishments:
Many cases do not go through an adjudicatory process at all, since the vol-
untary waiver of parental rights is a device widely employed by social work-
ers to gain custody of children. Because of the availability of the waivers...
they are exposed to the sometimes coercive arguments of welfare
departments.
56. 783 P.2d at 1160.
57. Section 1902 of Title 25 of the United States Code enunciates the congres-
sional policy underlying the Act:
The Congress hereby declares that it is the policy of this Nation to protect the
best interests of Indian children and to promote the stability and security of
Indian tribes and families by the establishment of minimum Federal stan-
dards for the removal of Indian children from their families and the place-
ment of such children in foster or adoptive homes which will reflect the
unique values of Indian culture, and by providing for assistance to Indian
tribes in the operation of child and family service programs.
25 U.S.C. § 1902 (1988) (emphasis added).
58. In re L.A.M., 727 P.2d 1057, 1060 (Alaska 1986); In re H.D., 11 Kan. App.
2d 531, 532, 729 P.2d 1234, 1237-38 (Ct. App. 1986); In re Adoption of R.R.R., 763
P.2d 94, 101 (Okla. 1988); In re N.A.H., 418 N.W.2d 310, 311 (S.D. 1988); but see In
re B.J.E., 422 N.W.2d 597, 600 (S.D. 1988) (holding that the failure to send tribe a
copy of amended petition naming child did not violate the ICWA where the child was
mentioned in several other documents).
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best interests of Indian children is a stated policy underlying the Act,59
the court must factor the needs and best interests of this child into its
construction of the statute. Where there are ambiguities, they should
be resolved in favor of those whom this statute seeks to protect,
namely Indian children and their tribes. 60
Even in the context of these complications, the Alaska Supreme
Court's decision is difficult to understand. Were section 1911(c), the
"right to intervene" provision, missing from the Act,61 the court's
reading of the rest of the statute would make more sense. The out-
come would still frustrate the purpose of the Act, but at least the court
could legitimately decide that it lacked the basis for inferring any right
to notice. It is hard to imagine how Congress could have stated a
comprehensive right to intervene any more clearly, however; and once
that right is recognized the court's decision is no longer logical. In
order to protect the best interests of both Indian children and Indian
tribes, Congress decided that the tribes must be able to intervene in
child custody proceedings involving their members.62 By failing to
consider the needs of those most directly affected by the application of
the ICWA, the Alaska Supreme Court's decision in Catholic Social
Services is detrimental to both the tribes and the children.
III. How THE CATHOLIC SOCIAL SERVICES DECISION
HURTS THE TRIBES
A stated purpose of the ICWA is to "promote the stability and
security of Indian tribes and families," 63 yet the Catholic Social Serv-
ices decision makes it more difficult for tribes to protect their interest
in the welfare and cultural heritage of children being voluntarily relin-
quished. In failing to recognize the tribes' right to intervene in volun-
tary termination proceedings, the court removed any special
consideration created by the Act and relegated the tribes to the same
status as any other party seeking to intervene. In most cases, the
59. 25 U.S.C. § 1902 (1988); see supra note 57 for the text of § 1902.
60. This proposition creates another delicate balancing act for the courts: What
disposition will serve the best interests of both child and tribe in a given case? When
the interests of the tribe and child conflict, the balance should be struck in favor of the
child. The Act is, at bottom, a regulation of child custody proceedings, which are
designed to protect the child's best interests. By factoring the tribes' interests into
relevant child custody proceedings, the Act enforces a general policy against removal
of children from the tribal environment. Where it can be shown that it would be
detrimental to the child in a given case for the court to act in the tribe's interest, the
court should err on the side of protecting the child.
61. See supra note 41.
62. H.R. REP. No. 1386, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 21 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 7530, 7544.
63. 25 U.S.C. § 1902 (1988). See also supra note 57.
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tribes will have trouble intervening in a timely manner and will be
forced to resort to collateral attacks on the termination decree in order
to be heard. Besides contravening congressional intent to allow the
tribes greater participation, this decision will inevitably lengthen and
complicate the resolution of voluntary relinquishment situations.
As potential intervenors in a civil proceeding, Indian tribes are in
a uniquely difficult position. On one hand, there is no question that
tribes have a sufficient interest in a relinquishment proceeding to jus-
tify intervention as of right or by discretion. The plain language of
section 1911(c) grants tribes the "right to intervene at any point in
[any State court] proceeding ... for the ... termination of parental
rights to an Indian child.... ."64 The Alaska Supreme Court has previ-
ously distinguished adoption proceedings from termination proceed-
ings in this context: "The Act . . distinguishes between 'adoptive
placement' and 'termination of parental rights;' only in the latter case
does section 1911(c) support intervention. ' 65
Even if section 191 l(c) is read as not granting an absolute right to
intervene, as the Alaska Supreme Court interpreted that statute in
Catholic Social Services, tribes have a sufficient interest in their mem-
ber children to warrant intervention as of right in a termination pro-
ceeding. 66 The tribe's interest in survival and stability is tied directly
to the welfare of its member children, and there is no other party that
can protect this interest in a termination proceeding; indeed, some par-
ties will affirmatively seek to avoid tribal participation in child custody
64. 25 U.S.C. § 1911(c) (1988).
65. In re J.R.S., 690 P.2d 10, 15 (Alaska 1984).
66. See, e.g., ALASKA R. Civ. P. 24(a); FED. R. Civ. P. 24(a). The Alaska Rule
states:
Upon timely application anyone shall be permitted to intervene in an action
when the applicant claims an interest relating to the property or transaction
which is the subject of the action and he is so situated that the disposition of
the action may as a practical matter impair or impede his ability to protect
that interest, unless the applicant's interest is adequately represented by ex-
isting parties.
The Federal Rule is identical, but adds that a party shall be permitted to intervene
"when a statute of the United States confers an unconditional right to intervene."
FED. R. Civ. P. 24(a)(1). The statement of policy accompanying the ICWA is signifi-
cant evidence that tribes were intended by Congress to participate in termination pro-
ceedings. See 25 U.S.C. § 1902 (1988) (See supra note 57 for text of section 1902.).
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proceedings. 67 Without some means of ensuring that tribes can inter-
vene, their ability to protect their interests as Congress intended will
be significantly impaired.68
On the other hand, tribes have no way of knowing that a volun-
tary termination is under way unless they are notified or find out about
it independently. 69 Whereas most parties whose interests intersect
closely enough with the litigants' will be in a position to know when
their rights will be affected by the proceeding, the tribes' interests are
abstract and intangible. No money or property is lost when an Indian
child is removed, voluntarily or not, from his or her native environ-
ment: the child's cultural ties and the tribe's human resources are re-
linquished instead. Nothing inherent in the proceeding will alert the
tribe to the fact that its interests are involved, and the confidential
nature of child custody proceedings in Alaska prevents a tribe from
discovering that an Indian parent is a party through any publicly
available means. 70 Without notification, a tribe runs a substantial risk
of being unable to intervene successfully in a termination proceeding. 71
Consequently, tribes may have to resort to collateral attacks on
termination decrees in order to be heard. One such possibility is an
action under 25 U.S.C. § 1914, which allows tribes to move to invali-
date decrees that violate the Act;72 this is in fact how the Catholic
67. See Brief for the Guardian ad litem at 4 (C.A.A. sought to avoid tribal partici-
pation in placing C.M.F. for adoption). See also Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians
v. Holyfield, - U.S. -, -, 109 S. Ct. 1597, 1602-03 (1989) (mother gave birth to
twins 200 miles from reservation to avoid Indian reservation domicile attaching to
children).
68. See In re J.R.S., 690 P.2d at 15 ("If Indian tribes are to protect the values
Congress recognized when it enacted the Indian Child Welfare Act, tribes must be
allowed to participate in hearings at which those values are significantly implicated.").
69. In fact, the only reason that CITC knew of this termination proceeding was
that C.A.A. contacted it herself when she sought to reverse the relinquishment. Brief
for Appellees at 6; see supra notes 32-33 and accompanying text.
70. See supra note 19.
71. Whether or not a motion is timely is not easily determined:
The timeliness of a motion to intervene does not depend solely on "the
amount of time which has elapsed since the litigation began [but also on]...
the related circumstances, including the purpose for which intervention is
sought.., and the improbability of prejudice to those already parties in the
case."
National Wildlife Fed'n v. Burford, 878 F.2d 422, 433 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (quoting
Hodgson v. United Mine Workers, 473 F.2d 118, 129 (D.C. Cir. 1972)). It is difficult
to determine the likelihood that a tribe's motion would be granted in a given case.
Even if it is granted, however, intervening late in the case may limit the tribe's
effectiveness.
72. Section 1914 states:
Any Indian child who is the subject of any action for.., termination of
parental rights under State law, any parent or Indian custodian from whose
custody the child was removed, and the Indian child's tribe may petition any
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Social Services case came about.73 Whether or not the inability to in-
tervene constitutes a violation of the Act is unclear in light of the
court's treatment of the right to intervene in Catholic Social Services.
There are numerous potential violations that can be alleged in a given
case, as C.A.A. and CITC did here,74 but the success or failure of such
an action would be highly unpredictable. 75
Another alternative is to mount a due process challenge, alleging
that the failure to recognize a right to notice unreasonably prevents
the tribe from adequately protecting its interests as recognized by Con-
gress. While the Catholic Social Services majority maintains that no
due process questions arise from its conclusion, its assertion is pre-
mised on its claim that "[t]he provisions of the Act which give tribes
the right to notice of certain proceedings and not to others, define the
scope of tribal rights. ' 76 This analysis reads the Act backwards: a
stated right to notice does not define a tribe's rights, but is the proce-
dure through which the tribe can protect its rights under the Act.
Congress clearly sought to allow tribes a more active role in child cus-
tody proceedings involving Indian children, as indicated in 25 U.S.C.§§ 1902 and 1911.77 The notice provision in 25 U.S.C. § 1912(a) 78
serves only to notify parents, Indian custodians and tribes of their
"right of intervention, ' 79 a right granted elsewhere in the Act (for ex-
ample, in section 1911(c)). Therefore, interpretation of the procedures
incorporated within the Act to protect these rights should reflect this
intent, and determination of what constitutes due process should fol-
low accordingly.
These potential avenues of attack are only speculative. Short of
reversal by the United States Supreme Court,80 or the Alaska Legisla-
ture,81 Indian tribes in Alaska will have great difficulty participating in
court of competent jurisdiction to invalidate such action upon a showing
that such action violated any provision of sections 1911, 1912, and 1913 of
this title.
25 U.S.C. § 1914 (1988).
73. See supra note 35.
74. See supra note 36.
75. The tribes also have to be careful to file their section 1914 action within the
one-year statute of limitations for actions to vacate an adoption decree. ALASKA
STAT. § 25.23.140 (Supp. 1989). In re T.N.F., 781 P.2d 973, 981 (Alaska 1989).
76. Catholic Social Sers., 783 P.2d at 1160.
77. See supra notes 57, 41, respectively.
78. 25 U.S.C. § 1912(a) (1988) (See infra note 81 for text of section 1912(a)).
79. 25 U.S.C. § 1912(a) (1988).
80. See supra note 50.
81. At the time of publication of this note, there is a bill before the Alaska Legis-
lature that would effectively overrule Catholic Social Services. H.R. 414, 16th Leg., 2d
Sess. (1990). This bill would, inter alia, amend ALASKA STAT. § 25.23.060 (1988) by
adding the following:
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proceedings voluntarily terminating the parental rights to Indian chil-
dren after this decision. Neither late intervention nor collateral attack
will effectively allow the tribe to protect its own interests or those of
the Indian child. At the same time, collateral attacks needlessly add
to the cost and length of litigation. This is an excessive price to pay to
protect the privacy of the relinquishing parent, especially considering
that the tribe's right to participate in the proceeding is intended re-
gardless of the parents' desire to exclude it. Even were the statute
construed to require the same procedures for notifying tribes of volun-
tary relinquishments as for involuntary terminations,82 the administra-
tive burden on the court and the parties would be minimal. More
importantly, though, recognizing a right to notice would ultimately
reduce litigation by rendering unnecessary the collateral challenges a
tribe might mount to ensure participation.
IV. How THE CATHOLIC SOCIAL SERVICES DECISION
HURTS THE CHILD
Lost in all of this analysis is any consideration of what is best for
the child, C.M.F. Courts traditionally determine the child's best inter-
ests in the last stages of a child placement proceeding.8 3 It is usually a
(d) In the case of an Indian child the representative of the person or agency
assuming custody of the child shall send notice of the execution of the con-
sent to adoption to the Indian child's tribe within 10 days after the consent is
executed.
In addition, it would amend ALASKA STAT. § 25.23.100(a) (1988) to require notice of
hearings on petitions to adopt, and ALASKA STAT. § 25.23.180(c) (1988) to provide
that tribes be notified within 10 days of the agency's taking custody and that no termi-
nation of parental rights could take place earlier than 10 days after notice to the tribe.
This bill would also amend ALASKA R. Cr., Adoption Rule 10(e), again to require
that notice of adoption or relinquishment proceedings involving Indian children be
given to the tribe at the time of petition.
82. Section 1912(a) describes these procedures as follows:
In any involuntary proceeding in a State court, where the court knows or
has reason to know that an Indian child is involved, the party seeking the...
termination of parental rights to an Indian child shall notify the parent or
Indian custodian and the Indian child's tribe, by registered mail with return
receipt requested, of the pending proceedings and of their right of interven-
tion. If the identity or location of the parent or Indian custodian and the
tribe cannot be determined, such notice shall be given to the Secretary [of
the Interior] in like manner, who shall have fifteen days after receipt to pro-
vide the requisite notice to the parent or Indian custodian and the tribe. No
... termination of parental rights proceeding shall be held until at least ten
days after receipt of notice by the parent or Indian custodian and the tribe or
the Secretary: Provided, That the parent or Indian custodian or the tribe
shall, upon request, be granted up to twenty additional days to prepare for
such proceeding.
25 U.S.C. § 1912(a) (1988).
83. See ALASKA STAT. § 25.23.120(c) (Supp. 1989) (court must determine that
adoption is in the best interest of person to be adopted before adoption order can
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finding of fact made by a trial court that determines the proper out-
come for that child at that point in his or her life. In a case such as
Catholic Social Services, where an appellate court is in the position of
interpreting a statute intended to benefit children, a determination of
the best interests of the collective "child," in this case Indian children
in Alaska, is no less relevant than when the trial court makes the de-
termination of the best interest of an individual child in a particular
case. Since protecting the best interests of children is an avowed aim
of the Act,84 any attempt to interpret the rights created under the
ICWA should include serious consideration of the impact that the in-
terpretation will have on the affected children. In deciding that tribes
are not entitled to notice of voluntary termination proceedings, the
Alaska Supreme Court overlooked the needs of the children being vol-
untarily relinquished on two levels: first, by hindering tribal participa-
tion and depriving children of their cultural heritage, and second, by
subjecting children to additional litigation and unnecessarily delaying
the permanent resolution of placement decisions.
A. Cultural Deprivation
The primary factor motivating the adoption of the ICWA was the
discovery in the mid-1970s that grossly inordinate numbers of Indian
children were being removed from their tribal homes and being placed
with Caucasian families. 85 In order to prevent the cultural biases
within the state's child protection systems from continuing to pillage
the Indian community, Congress created a series of policies and proce-
dures that became the Act.86 While the bulk of the testimony before
Congress revolved around involuntary removals of children from their
homes and tribes, 87 the dangers facing families as a result of unscrupu-
lously obtained "consent" to relinquish are no less real.88 C.A.A.
claims that CSS failed to explain the full range of relinquishment op-
tions to her, causing her to consent to relinquish rather than to con-
sent for adoption, as a means of getting her to surrender C.M.F. to the
agency as quickly as possible. 89 Whether or not CSS actually had such
motives is not important; the potential for abuse and deception exists
with voluntary terminations as well as with involuntary terminations.
issue); ALASKA STAT. § 47.10.082 (1984) (court shall consider best interests of child
in making involuntary termination order).
84. See supra note 57.
85. See Comment, supra note 12, at 131-32; Barsh, supra note 12, at 1288-1305;
Select Committee Hearings, supra note 12.
86. See Select Committee Hearings, supra note 12.
87. Id. at 537.
88. See supra note 55.
89. Brief for Appellees at 4-5.
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Children being voluntarily relinquished have as much at stake as
those being removed from their homes by the state and are equally in
need of protection. When wrongly relinquished from their homes and
tribes, they too are deprived of the opportunity to be raised in their
native culture and often suffer serious psychological and emotional set-
backs. 90 It is impossible to infer from the purpose and policy of the
Act that Congress contemplated different standards for protecting the
cultural heritage of Indian children being relinquished voluntarily
than for those being removed involuntarily. The explicit notice re-
quirement for involuntary terminations91 is more likely a means of
protecting the rights of the parents, mirroring the normal procedure
for instituting involuntary termination proceedings,92 than a measure
to ensure full consideration of the child's needs. If the focus of this
inquiry is properly reoriented toward the best interests of the children,
the need for any distinction between the two types of proceedings
disappears.
The Catholic Social Services decision makes it more difficult for
tribes to make tribal counseling services and other resources available
to Indian children and families at the stage of the termination process
when these resources might be most effective.93 C.A.A.'s contact with
her tribe did not occur until after her rights to C.M.F. had been for-
mally terminated, past the point where the tribe could have helped. 94
She argues in her brief that had tribal support services been offered at
the time of the initial proceeding, with an eye specifically toward keep-
ing her Indian family together, her family might not have been sepa-
rated.95 Though the argument is speculative, and, even if true, might
not reflect C.M.F.'s best interests, it shows how the Catholic Social
Services decision runs counter to the Act's general purposes by not
allowing tribes the opportunity to help their members at the outset. If
tribes participate in relinquishment proceedings from the beginning,
90. Barsh, supra note 12, at 1290-92.
91. 25 U.S.C. § 1912(a) (1988); see supra note 81.
92. ALASKA STAT. § 47.10.030(a),(b) (1984) (providing notice of involuntary ter-
mination proceedings to parents, minors and guardians interested in the action). See
also RLR v. State, 487 P.2d 27, 40 (Alaska 1971) (citing In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 33
(1967)) ("The child and his parents must receive notice which would be deemed ade-
quate in a civil or criminal proceeding.").
93. This contravenes the clear language of section 1912(d):
Any party seeking to effect a... termination of parental rights to an Indian
child under State law shall satisfy the court that active efforts have been
made to provide remedial services and rehabilitative programs designed to
prevent the breakup of the Indian family and that these efforts have proved
unsuccessful.
25 U.S.C. § 1912(d) (1988).
94. Brief for Appellees at 6.
95. Id. at n.10.
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their resources are available to the court and can be used in the dispo-
sition of the case. Without notification, however, tribes' ability to par-
ticipate in the proceeding at that stage is significantly impaired.
Tribal notification has two important benefits. First, it presents a
wider range of alternatives for the parents and child involved. In this
case, a tribal program might have been more successful in helping
C.A.A. to control her drinking and abusive behavior and may have
been able to prevent the family's problems from reaching the point
where relinquishment becomes an issue. When it is in the best inter-
ests of the child, a court might prefer to pursue avenues available
through the tribe rather than defaulting to a removal, voluntary or
otherwise. Second, tribal participation increases the likelihood that
the child will remain in an Indian environment, which not only pro-
tects the tribe's survival and stability but minimizes the psychological
trauma that often befalls Indian children who are removed from their
culture. 96 Since the language of the Act clearly supports a tribal right
of intervention, the Alaska Supreme Court should have interpreted the
Act to protect these important interests of the child.
B. Excessive Litigation
Another aspect of the child's best interest that should have been
considered by the Alaska Supreme Court is the effect of protracted
litigation on the child's well-being. The present case was first brought
into court in June 1986, and this appeal was decided in December
1989 with directions to remand for further proceedings. 97 Fully three-
and-a-half years later, there is no resolution to the termination pro-
ceeding, let alone the adoption. This is far too long to hold a child's
placement in limbo.
A child's sense of time is very different from an adult's.98 The
time necessary to resolve placement disputes judicially seems much
96. See Barsh, supra note 12, at 1291. A report by the American Academy of
Child Psychiatry cited within the text states:
[t]here is much clinical evidence to suggest that these Native American chil-
dren placed in off-reservation non-Indian homes are at risk in their later
development. Often enough they are cared for by devoted and well-inten-
tioned foster or adoptive parents. Nonetheless, particularly in adolescence,
they are subject to ethnic confusion and a pervasive sense of abandonment.
Id.
97. Catholic Social Sers., 783 P.2d at 1160.
98. J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD & A. SOLNIT, BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF
THE CHILD 40-45 (1979). The effects, both in terms of severity and in the type of
problems that may arise, will depend on the child's age as well as on other factors. In
a model child placement statute, the authors propose the following:
Trials and appeals shall be conducted as rapidly as is consistent with respon-
sible decisionmaking. The court shall establish a timetable for hearing, deci-
sion, and review on appeal which, in accord with the specific child's sense of
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longer to children than it does to adults. Delays in determining the
status of a child's relationships, whether with biological or adoptive
parents, can be psychologically harmful and can complicate adjust-
ment to the child's new environment. It is therefore vital for children
that placement decisions be made as quickly and permanently as
possible:
The child's-sense-of-time ... require[s] decisionmakers to act with
"all deliberate speed" to maximize each child's opportunity either
to restore stability to an existing relationship or to facilitate the es-
tablishment of new relationships to "replace" old ones. Procedural
and substantive decisions should never exceed the time that the
child-to-be-placed can endure loss and uncertainty.
The courts, social agencies, and all of the adults concerned
with child placement must greatly reduce the time they take for
decision .... Whatever the cause of the time-taking, the costs as
well as the benefits of the delay to the child must be weighed....
[T]o avoid irreparable psychological injury, placement, whenever in
dispute, must be treated as the emergency that it is to the child.99
Instead, the Catholic Social Services decision will only prolong the pro-
cess of resolving the child's placement. Whether or not section
1911(c) grants an absolute right to intervene, tribes that are not noti-
fied of voluntary termination proceedings can move to intervene, as
can all potentially interested parties, 100 and this will add new issues to
the trial. If they are not allowed to intervene, tribes can, as CITC did
here, move to invalidate the termination decree under section 1914.101
In effect, this decision may have foreclosed tribes from participating in
voluntary termination proceedings altogether; failing that, it will con-
tribute to the possibility that any such proceeding in the future could
be subject to the same collateral attacks, protracted appeals and cha-
otic uncertainty as in Catholic Social Services. In light of the Act's
purpose to protect Indian children from unnecessary harm stemming
from cultural biases in the child removal and adoption procedures, the
court should have looked more carefully at the impact on Indian chil-
dren when interpreting the ICWA. When considered alongside the
minimal burden created by providing notice of voluntary relinquish-
ment proceedings to the tribe, the Catholic Social Services decision is
difficult to understand.
time, shall maximize the chances of all interested parties to have their sub-
stantive claims heard while still viable, and shall minimize the disruption of
parent-child relationships.
Id. at 101.
99. Id. at 4243. The authors add the following note at the same point in their
text: "Three months may not be a long time for an adult decisionmaker. For a young
child it may be forever." Id.
100. See supra note 66.
101. See supra note 72.
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V. CONCLUSION
Catholic Social Services, Inc. v. C.A.A. presented the Alaska
Supreme Court with a situation that had never before been litigated.
This decision is not likely to affect the lives of many children directly
and by itself does not represent a severe breakdown in the protections
the Act affords children and tribes in the majority of cases. It does,
however, demonstrate how courts focus on the wrong concerns when
deciding issues affecting children. As much as this case purports to be
a battle between the rights of the appellants and the appellees, it is in
reality a proceeding to determine who will be C.M.F.'s parents. The
Indian Child Welfare Act is designed to protect the child and her tribe
to the extent stated by Congress, and it is that goal that should frame
any interpretation of the Act's language.
It is difficult to understand what motivated the Alaska Supreme
Court to summarily refuse tribes notice of termination proceedings.
Without addressing section 1911(c), the court dismissed the tribe's
right to intervene, and consequently reduced the tribe's ability to par-
ticipate to that of any other citizen. Though it did not make explicit
provision for tribal notice of voluntary termination proceedings, there
is no reading of the Act consistent with its purposes that achieves the
result reached by the majority in Catholic Social Services. This overly
narrow reading of the Act's language could not have been what Con-
gress intended, and ironically, makes more vulnerable the parties that
the Act explicitly intends to protect.
Douglas R. Nazarian
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